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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-TORT LIABILITY OF MUNICIPALITY FOR INJURY
CAUSED BY NEGLECT TO PERFORM MANDATORY DuTY-By statute the State of
New Jersey imposed upon every New Jersey municipality the obligation to insure the drivers of municipal motor vehicles against liability for damages resulting from the operation of such vehicles. The Township of Lyndhurst neglected
to procure insurance in favor of plaintiff, and a personal judgment was recovered
against him for his negligent operation of a township £.re truck while in pursuance of his municipal duties. Plaintiff brought the present action to recover from
the municipality for its breach of the statutory obligation. Judgment below was
for defendant. On appeal, held, affirmed, three justices dissenting. The mandatory power to insure its drivers imposed a governmental duty upon the municipality. Absent express provision for a private right of action for breach of such
a duty, the remedy must be by way of indictment rather than by private civil
action. Osback v. Lyndhurst Township, (N.J. 1951) 81 A. (2d) 721.
It is a well-recognized rule of tort law that where a party fails to conform to
a statutory standard of conduct and injury results to one whom the statute is
intended to protect, a civil action will lie in behalf of the one injured. 1 Where
the wrongdoer is a municipal corporation, however, this rule must be qualified
in the light of general principles of municipal tort liability.2 Thus, where the

lPnossBn, TonTS §39 (1941).
See generally, 6 McQmLLBN,
Jun. 260 et seq.
2

MUNICIPAL CoRPORATIONS,

c. 53 (1937); 38 AM..

478

MrcHIGAN LAw REvrnw

[Vol. 50

municipal breach of conduct relates to a governmental activity, it has traditionally
been held that no liability arises in the municipality unless express statutory
provision is made therefor.3 On the other hand, where the municipal fault pertains to a proprietary,4 corporate,5 or ministerial6 activity, no immunity is recognized and civil liability may be enforced. Unfortunately, the proper characterization of particular municipal functions as governmental or otherwise presents a
vexing problem.7 While diverse classificatory criteria have been suggested,8 the
courts have arrived at no concensus in the matter. 9 Indeed, different courts have
so frequently reached different conclusions as to the label to be attached to the
same function10 that one may suspect that at least upon occasion the characterization has rather followed than determined the court's decision on the question
of liability. The unsatisfactory state of the law in this area is well illustrated by
the principal case. Here the result was contingent upon the court's characterization. of a mandatory power to provide liability insurance for a member of the
municipal fire department. On the theory that the municipality, in exercising a
mandatory power, is simply an arm of the state and partakes of its immunity, the
court found the imposed duty to be governmental in nature.11 While under
New Jersey law civil liability might yet have attached if the breach had been by
active wrongdoing rather than by mere nonfeasance,12 or if express statutory
3 Nicholson v. Detroit, 129 Mich. 246, 88 N.W. 695 (1902); Gurley v. Brown, 65
Nev. 245, 193 P. (2d) 693 (1948); 6 McQmLLEN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §2793
(1937).
.
4 Layer v. City of Buffalo, 274 N.Y. 135, 8 N.E. (2d) 307 (1937); Douglas v. Hollis,
86 N.H. 578, 172 A. 433 (1934).
5 Lockwood v. Dover, 73 N.H. 209, 61 A. 32 (1905); 6 McQmLLEN, MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS §2792 (1937).
6 Johnston v. City of Chicago, 258 Ill. 494, 101 N.E. 960 (1913).
7 McQuillen laconically observes, "These rules concerning municipal liability • • •
are elementary. The only difficulty is in their application••.." MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
1056 (1937).
s For discussion of such criteria, see Borchard, "Government Liability in Tort," 34
YALE L.J. 129 at 132-133 (1924); Smith, "Municipal Tort Liability," 48 MicH. L. REv.
41 at 44 et seq. (1949); 1 BROOKLYN L. REv. 85 (1932); and see Barker v. City of Santa
Fe, 47 N.M. 85, 136 P. (2d) 480 (1943).
.
9 Lloyd v. Mayor, etc. of New York, 5 N.Y. 369 at 375 (1851); Irvine v. Town of
Greenwood, 89 S.C. 511, 72 S.E. 228 (1911); Rhoumbos v. Chicago, 332 Ill. 70, 163
N.E. 361 (1928).
10 Compare the following cases discussing the municipal duty properly to maintain
the public streets: Majka v. Haskell, 301 N.Y. 206, 93 N.E. (2d) 641 (1950); Gillies v.
City of Minneapolis, (D.C. Minn. 1946) 66 F. Supp. 467; Tolliver v. City of Newark, 145
Ohio St. 517, 62 N.E. (2d) 357 (1945); Aerotec v. Town of Greenwich, (Conn. 1951)
82 A. (2d) 356; as to the operation of fire-fighting equipment, compare Powell v. Village
of Fenton, 240 Mich. 94, 214 N.W. 968 (1927); Fowler v. City of Cleveland, 100 Ohio
St. 158, 126 N.E. 72 (1919), overruled by Aldrich v. City of Youngstown, 106 Ohio St.
342, 140 N.E. 164 (1922); and Maxwell v. Miami, 87 Fla. 107, 100 S. 147 (1924).
11 Cf. Springfield v. Carter, (8th Cir. 1949) 175 F. (2d) 914; City of Midland v.
Hamlin, (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) 239 S.W. (2d) 159. Immunity to private suit is conferred upon the states by the Eleventh Amendment of the Federal Constitution.
12 Kehoe v. Rutherford, 74 N.J.L. 659, 65 A. 1046 (1907); Callan v. Passaic, 104
N.J.L. 643, 141 A. 778 (1928).
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provision had been made for liability in the event of default,13 neither of these
conditions was met. Accordingly, the general rule of immunity for default in the
discharge of a governmental duty was held to be applicable.14 On the other hand,
the Court could have found ample authority to support a contrary result, holding
that a mandatory power is not inherently govemmental,15 that in the principal
case the obligation to provide insurance involved merely a ministerial duty,16
and that no express statutory authorization was required for a civil action brought
for private injury resulting from the breach of a mandatory ministerial duty.17
Since the tendency of the courts has been steadily to narrow the scope of municipal immunity18 and since the policy basis for a decision upholding immunity
in the instant case seems questionable,19 it would not have been surprising if the
decision had adopted the latter view. 20 But the court apparently regarded prior
case authority as too closely in point to be disregarded. 21 The decision is illus13 Truhlar

v. Borough of E. Paterson, 4 N.J. 490, 73 A. (2d) 163 (1950).
Note 3 supra.
15 6 McQUILLEN, MUNICIPAL CoRPORATIONS 1063 (1937); 38 AM. JuR. 273; and
see Day v. City of Berlin, (1st Cir. 1946) 157 F. (2d) 323.
16 "Official action • • . is ministerial when it is absolute, certain and imperative involving merely the execution of a set task, and . . . nothing remains for discretion." 38
AM. JuR. 273. Though it is conceded plaintiff's employment was in pursuance of a governmental function and though the duty to insure him is regarded as collateral to that employment, this need not be conclusive as to the governmental nature of the collateral duty.
6 McQmLLEN, MUNICIPAL CoRPORATIONS 1034 (1937). See also Scibilia v. City of
• Philadelphia, 279 Pa. 549 at 554-555, 124 A. 273 (1924).
17 See Consolidated Apartment House Co. v. Baltimore, 131 Md. 523 at 532, 102 A.
920 (1917).
18 Smith, "Municipal Tort Liability," 48 MxcH. L. REv. 41 at 45 (1949); 46 HARv.
L. REv. 305 (1932).
19 The majority result is not calculated to make public service attractive. By rigid
application of an ancient and somewhat dubious maxim, it would permit the £nancial ruin
of a public employee who inadvertently commits a tort in the good faith discharge of his
duties, reasonably believing himself covered by municipally-procured insurance and though
he might otherwise have taken out insurance at his own expense. Note that if the municipality had contributed funds to defend the original action against plaintiff or had reimbursed
him for the amount of the judgment, this would have been an expenditure for a proper
public purpose. Cullen v. Town of Carthage, 103 Ind. 196, 2 N,E. 571 (1885); 2 McQUILLEN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §532 (1937). Perhaps plaintiff's position was prejudiced by the fact that he was himself a tortfeasor. But his tort was distinct from the
alleged tort of the municipality.
20 It should be noticed that an alternative line of analysis might have found liability
in the municipality, entirely short-cutting the problem of classi£cation of municipal powers.
The statute, being mandatory, might have been construed as expressing the intention of the
legislature that the municipality be £nancially responsible for its torts as to those for whose
bene£t the statute was passed. The question would then be whether the statute was passed
for the bene£t of (1) the employee, (2) the injured party, or (3) both. If either (I) or
(3), recovery would have followed in this case. Cf. Pohland v. City of Sheboygan, 251
Wis. 20, 27 N.W. (2d) 736 (1947).
2 1 Pray v. Mayor, etc. of Jersey City, 32 N.J.L. 394 (1868); Board of Chosen Freeholders of Sussex v. Strader, 18 N.J.L. 108 (1840); Knauer v. City of Ventnor City, 13
N.J. Misc. 864, 181 A. 895 (1935).
14
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trative of the anomalous results which will continue in municipal tort cases until
adequate state legislation is brought to bear upon the governmental immunity
doctrine.22

]. S. Ransmeier, S. Ed.

22 46 HARv. L. REv. 305 (1932). As to the proper scope of municipal immunity, see
Smith, "Municipal Tort Liability," 48 M1CH. L. REv. 41 at 49-56 (1949).

